We study the problem of selling identical items to n unitdemand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of items is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and the seller must make the allocation and payment decisions online with the goal of maximizing social welfare. We consider two models of unknown supply: the adversarial supply model, in which the mechanism must produce a welfare guarantee for any arbitrary supply, and the stochastic supply model, in which supply is drawn from a distribution known to the mechanism, and the mechanism need only provide a welfare guarantee in expectation.
INTRODUCTION
This paper belongs to a line of research that studies online mechanism design, which focuses on markets in which decisions are made dynamically before information regarding the state of the world has been fully revealed. Previous work in online mechanism design mainly concerned settings where customers that arrive dynamically compete for buying a known set of items (see a recent survey [28] ). However, in many real-world settings the supply arrives dynamically and the exact number of items for sale is uncertain. This, for example, is the case in the sale of banner ads impressions, where the number of impressions is not known in advance to the seller; Such a seller must decide which advertisement to show in a fraction of a second after the impression arrives, while the future supply is uncertain. 1 In this work, we investigate an online setting in which a mechanism allocates identical items to a fixed set of bidders when the supply of items is unknown, and items arrives online. Each bidder desires only one item and has private value for getting an item. We require that the mechanism allocates items and extracts payment for them as they arrive. We aim to build mechanisms that maximize the social welfare. Our model does not allow delaying payment decisions to the end of the auction, and that requirement is central in our analysis. In fact, if delayed payments are allowed, then full efficiency can be easily obtained by charging the bidders VCG payments when the auction ends. The requirement for immediate payments has been recently studied in several papers (for example, by Gershkov and Moldovanu [11, 12] and Dobzinski et al [6] ), also in settings where the problem becomes simple if delayed payments were allowed. Immediate payments is a natural practical constraint, satisfied by many real-world markets. Most often customers are charged upon delivery and will not be asked to wait until the supply is exhausted. Buyers in such markets may want to leave the arena and settle all their charges beforehand; Moreover, sellers may also want to secure payments before delivering the item. Finally, even in markets in which customers are able to defer their payments (such as auctions for search ads), sellers typically calculate payments periodically, which allows customers to better keep track of their spending.
One of the "holy grails" of the mechanism-design literature is the design of "detail-free" mechanisms, along the lines of the Wilson Doctrine [30] . Such robust mechanisms need not be aware of specific characteristics of the environment, and in particular, not rely on common-prior assumptions. In this paper, we first prove that any "detail-free" mechanism, that observes no distributional information, will have poor worst-case guarantees. We therefore continue by introducing a novel model with minimal distributional assumptions for which we can show positive results. This is a hybrid stochastic model where the seller knows how the supply is distributed, but we do not assume any prior distribution on the bidders' valuations. This captures scenarios such as online advertising, in which sellers can easily collect statistics on the supply (e.g., number of ad impressions per day) but obtaining statistics on the actual valuations of the bidders is harder and may require complex equilibrium analysis. This comes in contrast to most of the work in computer science on online mechanism design that has been in the fully adversarial setting. In economics, at the other extreme, dynamic mechanism design has been recently studied in a full Bayesian setting that assumes the existence of commonly known prior distributions on the bidders' preferences. This paper explores the cost of ignoring distributional information. We produce a strong separation: Our main results are impossibility results in the adversarial-supply setting, and truthful approximation mechanisms in the stochastic-supply setting.
We wish to maximize social welfare, which is a desirable goal even from the perspective of a for-profit seller that does not have the luxury of operating under monopoly conditions. An economically efficient market (one that maximizes the combined welfare of the customers and the seller) will be more attractive to customers, and avoids harming the seller in the long term at the expense of short-term profits. In fact, the generalized second price auction currently used to sell search advertisements has social welfare, rather than revenue guarantees [9] . We stress that there are no information-theoretic or algorithmic obstacles to maximizing social welfare in our model, and the hardness stems from satisfying the incentive constraints.
We consider a strong version of dominant-strategy truthfulness, where truthful revelation of private values is a dominant strategy for all possible states of the world, and not only in expectation. 2 In particular, truthful reporting will be a dominant strategy for every realization of supply and randomness of the mechanism. This equilibrium concept has several important advantages. First, the seller does not need to know how risk-averse the bidders are or assume that they are risk-neutral. It does not require the seller to disclose the details of the distribution, which may reflect important business information. Additionally, it avoids the complication of buyers who may receive private signals that create heterogeneity in their beliefs, which may also differ from the seller's belief (see [1] for an empirical example). Our main result in this model is positive; we show that even with this strong equilibrium concept, a truthful mechanism can obtain a constant fraction of the "offline" optimum. We note that in environments where the supply distribution is common knowledge and where bidders are known to be risk neutral, then truthfulness in expectation might be a reasonable solution concept; In such cases, optimal social welfare can be achieved using expected VCG prices (see, e.g., [3, 29, 2] ).
Our Results
We first fully characterize the set of universally truthful mechanisms that are constrained to collect payments as items are allocated, and prove a surprising lemma: in the stochastic setting, we can (almost) without loss of generality consider mechanisms that determine an upper bound on the number of items to be sold without considering the values of the bids.
We then consider the adversarial supply setting in which welfare guarantees are required to hold for any realization of supply. Our first main result are lower bounds on the approximation obtainable by truthful mechanisms:
Theorem: Every truthful mechanism achieves a diminishing fraction (in the number of bidders) of the optimal social welfare. Specifically, no deterministic truthful mechanism achieves better than n-approximation and no randomized truthful mechanism achieves better than Ω(log log n)approximation.
The linear lower bound is simple, and is in the spirit of the lower bound given by Lavi and Nisan [21] for a model in which bidders that arrive online bid for a fixed set of expiring items. We note that an n-approximation to social welfare can be achieved by the trivial mechanism which simply allocates the first item to the highest bidder at the second highest price, and does not allocate any additional items. The randomized lower bound is more technically challenging. To prove it we give a characterization of truthful mechanisms in our setting, and a distribution over bidder values. From this, we derive a system of equations that can be simultaneously satisfied only if there exists a mechanism which achieves a strong welfare guarantee when given this distribution over bidders. We show that no such satisfying assignment exists, which gives the lower bound.
If we further require that our mechanisms be online envyfree (a desirable fairness property that we define in section 6), we can strengthen the above lower bound to show that no randomized truthful mechanism can achieve better than an Ω(log n/ log log n) approximation to social welfare. We show that this last result is almost tight by giving a truthful, online-envy-free mechanism which achieves a log n approximation to social welfare. We leave open the problem of closing the gap between our upper and lower bounds for nonenvy-free randomized mechanisms, which seems to require different techniques. All our lower bounds hold even for algorithms that are not computationally restricted, while our upper bounds follow from computationally efficient mechanisms.
Given the impossibility in the adversarial-supply model, we then consider the stochastic-supply setting in which supply is drawn from a distribution D known to the mechanism, and welfare guarantees are required to hold in expectation over D. We make the assumption (standard in mechanism design in the context of bidder valuations, but also natural here) that D has a non-decreasing hazard rate 3 . We again stress that we make no assumptions about bidder valuations at all. Our second main result is a positive one:
Theorem: There exists a truthful mechanism that achieves a constant approximation to social welfare when supply is drawn from a known distribution with nondecreasing hazard rate.
This mechanism is simple, deterministic, computationally efficient, and easy to implement, but it's analysis is surprisingly subtle. We stress again that the incentive properties of our mechanisms do not rely on any distributional information. As noted, truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for every set of bids, for every realized supply and not only in expectation. The constant we prove is 16 7 8 , that is, about 6% of the optimum. Of course, this is our proven safetylevel guarantee, and in actuality the achieved welfare can be much higher. We prove that for specific distributions our mechanism indeed achieves better results, for example, at least 60% of the optimum for the uniform distribution, and 46% of the optimum for geometric distributions. We also demonstrate numerically that our mechanism achieves at least 60% of the optimum for the binomial distribution. We note that the "offline" optimum cannot be achieved in our model, as we show that no deterministic truthful mechanism guarantees more than 62% of the offline optimum (and we prove a bound of 86% for randomized mechanisms).
We also show that some condition on the supply distribution is necessary: We demonstrate a supply distribution that does not satisfy the monotone hazard rate condition over which no deterministic mechanism can achieve a constant approximation (or, in particular, better than an Ω( log n/ log log n) approximation) to social welfare. As mentioned, our mechanism is deterministic, and does not involve randomization techniques used in previous papers for obtaining truthful approximations (like random sampling, see [17, 8] ).
Finally, we also consider the setting in which the bidders preferences may exhibit complementarities for multiple items (increasing marginal utilities). We study the the extreme case of knapsack valuations (or single-minded bidders) and show strong lower bounds (even in the stochastic supply setting) on the competitive ratio that any algorithm can achieve, even without incentive constraints. We provide an algorithm with an exactly matching competitive ratio to prove that our lower bound is tight.
Related Work
Mahdian and Saberi [22] study mechanisms in which the supply is unknown and arrives online. They consider revenue maximization in the adversarial supply setting when payments may be deferred until the end of the auction. They achieve a constant approximation to the optimal revenue. Devanur and Hartline [7] study the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the same setting. Our focus on the other hand is on welfare approximation and not on revenue, and we require immediate payments.
Dynamic settings where payment decisions must be made online have been studied in several recent papers. Gershkov and Moldovanu [11, 12] study dynamic models in which the values of the bidders are drawn from a distribution that is initially unknown to the seller. The seller learns the distribution as bidders arrive, but cannot charge them expected VCG prices while the distribution is unknown. Like in our model, a VCG solution would be easy to implement if payment decisions could be deferred until the end of the auction. Cole, Dobzinski, and Fleischer [6] also required that bidders learn their payment immediately upon winning an item (they called such mechanisms prompt mechanisms). They study a problem in which the supply of m expiring items is fixed and known to the mechanism, but the bidders arrive and depart online. They wish to maximize social welfare, and give a truthful log m competitive mechanism, and show a lower bound of 2 even for randomized mechanisms. Similar models of online auctions with expiring goods were studied earlier by Lavi and Nisan [21] and by Hajiaghayi et al. [15] . These models relate to ours since the allocation decisions for items with expiration date (airline tickets, for instance) must be made online. In these papers, however, there is no uncertainty on the supply and bidders arrive and depart over time. More on online auctions, which were first discussed by Lavi and Nisan [20] , can be found in the survey [28] .
A recent line of papers studies online mechanism design in a Bayesian setting (e.g., [4, 2, 3] ), where welfare-maximizing, and even budget balanced, generalizations of VCG mechanisms are presented for online settings. Our paper does not assume a Bayesian preference model and, as our lower bounds show, socially-efficient outcomes cannot be truthfully implemented. In the economics literature, stochastic supply has only been studied in a handful of papers. Most of this work (see, for example, [18, 26] ) studied a Bayesian model and focused on characterizing equilibrium prices. Uncertain supply models can be viewed as more complicated versions of the classic sequential auctions model, which is technically hard to analyze even without uncertainty on the supply (see, e.g., [24, 23] ). Finally, two recent papers with algorithmic results in the same spirit as ours are [10] who showed that the 1 − 1/e approximation barrier can actually be improved when the input to the matching problem is stochastic, and [7] who studied an online keyword matching problem where bidders are constrained by a budget; [7] showed that when statistical information is used (they assumed a random permutation of bidders), then a similar 1 − 1/e approximation can be significantly improved. Note that unlike [10] and [7] , the main constraint in our paper is incentive compatibility.
MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We consider a set of n bidders {1, . . . , n}, each desires a single item from a set of identical items (except in Section 7 in which we expand our model to agents interested in multiple items.) Each bidder has a non-negative valuation vi for an item. A mechanism M is a (possibly randomized) allocation rule paired with a payment rule. Bidders report their valuations to the mechanism before any item arrives, and the mechanism assigns items as they arrive to bidders, and simultaneously charges each bidder i some price pi. When items arrive and bidders have submitted bids v 1 , . . . , v n , we denote the outcome of the mechanism by M ((v 1 , . . . , v n ), r) where r is a random bitstring which may be used by randomized mechanisms. We note that the mechanism is unaware of , as it only encounters the items one at a time as they arrive. We will leave out the r when it is clear from context. We adopt standard notation and write v −i to denote the set of valuations reported by all bidders other than bidder i. A bidder i who receives an item obtains utility ui(vi; M (v 1 , . . . , v n )) = vi − pi. Bidders who do not receive an item obtain utility 0. Bidders wish to maximize their own utility, and may misrepresent their valuations to the mechanism in order to do so.
We require that our mechanisms be truthful : that bidders should be incentivized to report their true valuations, regardless of the bids of others or the realizations of the supply. Following the literature (e.g. Goldberg et al. [13] , Guruswami et al. [14] ) we define a randomized truthful mechanism to be a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms.
if for every bidder i with value vi, for every set of bids v −i , for every alternative bid v i and for every r and :
We will assume that bidders submit their true valuations to truthful mechanisms, since it is a dominant strategy for them to do so.
Without loss of generality, we imagine that v1, . . . , vn are written in non-increasing order. The social welfare achieved by a mechanism is the sum of the values of the bidders to whom it has allocated items, which we denote by W (M ((v1, . . . , vn), r)). When items arrive, we will denote the optimal social welfare by
We will be concerned with approximation guarantees to social welfare in both the adversarial supply setting and the stochastic supply setting.
Definition 2.2. A mechanism M achieves an α-approximation to social welfare in the adversarial supply setting if for every supply :
OPT Er [W (M ((v 1 ,...,vn),r))] ≤ α When is drawn from a distribution D, a mechanism M achieves an α-approximation to social welfare in the stochastic supply setting if:
We remark that in computing our approximation ratios, we are comparing the performance of our online mechanism with the expected value of the offline OPT. This is natural in the adversarial setting. In the stochastic setting, we might alternatively seek to compare our algorithms to the optimal online policy. We adopt this stronger benchmark because using it we are still able to achieve constant factor approximations, which is surprising. However, this strong benchmark may mike the notation OPT somewhat misleading: as we show, no online mechanism can achieve OPT exactly.
In the stochastic setting, we will assume unless otherwise specified that D satisfies the non-decreasing hazard rate condition:
Pr [ ≥i] . We write simply hi when the distribution is clear from context. D satisfies the non-decreasing hazard rate condition if hi(D) is a non-decreasing sequence in i.
The non-decreasing hazard rate condition is standard in mechanism design (see, for example, [25, 19] and recent computer-science work [5, 16] ), and is satisfied by many natural distributions, including the exponential, uniform, and binomial distributions.
One might also consider an intermediate model in which supply is drawn from a distribution satisfying the non decreasing hazard rate condition, but the distribution is unknown to the mechanism. However, we note that since point distributions satisfy the hazard rate condition, adversarial supply is a special case of this model, and so our lower bounds apply.
CHARACTERIZATION
In this section, we provide a full characterization of truthful mechanisms in our setting, and some useful lemmas that allow us to consider mechanisms from a particularly simple class in the stochastic setting. The characterization follows from two lemmas. The reader is referred to the full version of the paper for the missing proofs.
Lemma 3.1. For every truthful mechanism and for any realization of items, the price p b that bidder b is charged upon winning (any) item is independent of his bid.
Proof. This is a standard fact characterizing truthful auctions; If there is some realization of items for which bidder b has two distinct bids which result in bidder b winning an item, but at a different price, then in the case in which his valuation is equal to the bid that yields an item at the higher price, he will report falsely that his valuation is equal to the bid that yields an item at the lower price. Proof. Suppose for some realization of items, and for some fixed set of bids of the other bidders, bidder b can change his bid to v b or v b , and win one of two items, item i or item j, and that if he bids his true valuation v b , he wins item j > i. Now consider a realization in which only i items arrive; If bidder b bids v b , he wins no item and receives utility 0. If he bids v b , he wins item i at his (bid independent) price p b , and achieves higher utility v b − p b . Therefore, the mechanism is not truthful.
The converse of the characterization is immediate: any mechanism that assigns winner order and prices bid independently is truthful.
In the stochastic setting, we can (almost) without loss of generality consider a particularly simple kind of mechanism: Definition 3.3. A bid-independent supply mechanism chooses an ordering on the bidders π and a supply g independently of the bids. It then sells items as they arrive to the g highest bidders, ordered according to π, at the g + 1st highest price.
Lemma 3.4. For any distribution D and any deterministic truthful mechanism M that achieves an α approximation to social welfare over D, there is a truthful deterministic bid-independent supply mechanism M that achieves an α 2 approximation to social welfare.
Proof. Let gmax be the maximum number of items M sells when full supply is realized, where the maximum is taken over all possible bid profiles. Let M be the mechanism that always sells the first gmax items to the gmax highest bidders in some predetermined order at the gmax + 1st highest price, and sells no further items. Note that M is online-envy-free and has bid-independent sell sequence. First observe that OPTg max ≥ OPT/α. This follows because by definition, M can never achieve welfare beyond OPTg max , but by assumption, M achieves an α approximation to the optimal social welfare. Next, observe that PrD[ ≥ gmax] ≥ 1/α. To see this, consider some bid profile which causes M to produce a supply gmax. Let bi be the bidder who receives item gmax, and consider raising his valuation vi until it constitutes all but a negligible fraction of the total possible social welfare. By lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, raising bi's bid does not affect either the supply offered by the mechanism, or the order in which bi receives an item: that is, it continues to be the case that bi receives an item if and only if at least gmax items arrive. However, since bi now constitutes an arbitrarily large fraction of the total social welfare, and M is an α-approximation mechanism, it must be that P r[ ≥ gmax] ≥ 1/α.
Finally, we observe that our mechanism achieves welfare at least OPTg max · Pr[ ≥ gmax] ≥ OPT/α 2 , which completes the proof.
ADVERSARIAL SUPPLY
In this section we consider the adversarial model in which we do not have a distribution over supply and we require a good approximation to social welfare for any number of items that arrive. We first show that deterministic truthful mechanisms cannot achieve any approximation better than the trivial n-approximation. We then consider randomized mechanisms, and give a lower bound of Ω(log log n), proving in particular that no constant approximation is possible.
Deterministic Mechanisms
We begin by proving that deterministic mechanisms can only achieve a trivial approximation. The proof follows easily from our characterization of truthful mechanisms, and a simple lemma:
Lemma 4.1. For any deterministic mechanism that achieves an n-approximation to social welfare, every bidder has a bid such that they are allocated the first item.
Proof. Any bidder b can set his bid to more than n times the second highest bidder. If the mechanism does not allocate the first item to b, then if there are no further items, the mechanism has not achieved an n-approximation to social welfare.
Theorem 4.2. No deterministic truthful mechanism can achieve better than an n approximation to social welfare.
Proof Proof of Theorem. By Lemma 4.1, any bidder can win the first item with an appropriately high bid. But by Lemma 3.2, any bidder such that p b < v b who has a bid for which he can win the first item cannot win any other item with any bid. Therefore, for any set of bidders bi such that for all bi, p b i = v b i , then any deterministic truthful mechanism that achieves an n-approximation can only sell the first item. If all bidders have value 1 ≤ v b i ≤ 1 + , this achieves no better than an n-approximation when all items arrive. It remains to demonstrate such a set of bidders: Consider an arbitrary set of n + 1 distinct values between 1 and 1 + . For each bidder, choose a value from this set independently at random. Since each bidders price p b i is independent of his bid, by Lemma 3.1, the probability that v b i = p b i is at most 1/(n + 1), and by the union bound, the probability that any bidders bid equals its price threshold is at most n/(n + 1) ≤ 1. Therefore, there exists a set of bids sampled from this set with the desired property, which completes the proof.
Randomized Mechanisms

An Ω(log log n) lower bound
We next present our first main result, a lower bound for randomized truthful mechanisms.
Theorem 4.3. No truthful randomized mechanism can achieve an o(log log n) approximation to social welfare when faced with adversarial supply.
Proof. A truthful randomized mechanism is simply a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms. To prove our randomized lower bound, we will exhibit a distribution over bidder values such that no deterministic truthful mechanism achieves a good approximation to welfare in expectation over this random instance. By Yao's min-max principle, this is sufficient to prove a lower bound on randomized mechanisms.
We define a distribution V with support over values 1/2 i for 0 ≤ i ≤ log n − 1. For each realization v ∈ V , we let: Pr[v = 1/2 i ] = 2 i /(n − 1). Therefore, we have Pr[v ≥ 1/2 i ] = (2 i+1 −1)/(n−1) and E[v|v ≥ 1/2 i ] = (i+1)/(2 i+1 − 1). Proof. We defer the proof to the full version of the paper.
By Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, we may characterize deterministic truthful mechanisms as follows: The mechanism assigns to each bidder b a bin i b and a threshold t b . i b and t b are independent of b's bid v b , but are assigned such that at most one bidder in each bin can have a bid above his threshold. 4 If v b > t b , b wins item i (if it arrives) at price t b . Equivalently, we may imagine the mechanism operating by ordering bidders in some permutation π such that for all i, every bidder in bucket i is ordered before every bidder in bucket j > i. When the first item arrives, the mechanism offers it to each bidder at their threshold price, in order of π until some bidder b accepts. We continue in this manner, offering the next item to bidders starting at b + 1 until one accepts, etc.
We construct a distribution over instances by drawing each bidder's valuation independently from the distribution V described above. Since bidder's thresholds and buckets are independent of their own bids, each value encountered by the mechanism when making offers in order of π is distributed randomly according to V (note that although the values are distributed randomly, they need not be independent of each other). We may assume without loss of generality that each threshold
When all n items arrive, the expected welfare achieved by a mechanism is:
Let N b denote the number of items sold by a mechanism after making offers to b bidders. Then we have more generally, when k items arrive, the expected welfare achieved by a mechanism is:
If our mechanism achieves an α approximation to social welfare, we therefore have the following n constraints on the values of c b chosen by the mechanism. For all 1 ≤ k ≤ n:
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4.4. After offering the item to b bidders, the expected number of sales is E[
By plugging our bound into constraint 1, we have for all k: Proof. We defer the proof of this technical lemma to the full version of the paper.
So, for all k, there must exist an integer b k such that simultaneously the two equations hold:
In particular, if k ≥ 2 15α and n ≥ 30, then n log k 4α ≤ (n−1) log k 2α −3.5n. Therefore, there must exist integers b k to satisfy the equations:
We will consider the smallest such set of b k : For all k,
. Note that if we reduce a larger b k in this manner, inequality 3 continues to hold, and so this is without loss of generality.
We let k = 2 15α and consider the sequence of integers k, 2k, 4k, . . . , 2 t k such that n ≥ 2 t k > n/2. For j ≥ 1 we write ∆ j k = (b 2 j k − b 2 j−1 k ), and ∆ 0 k = b k . We note that from inequality 2 and our assumption on the b k , we have:
ci ≥ n 4α . Exponentiating both sides and applying the AM-GM inequality we have:
where the last inequality follows from inequality 3. This gives us:
. We can expand the above recursive bound to isolate ∆ j k and find ∆ j k = Ω(n/(α(j + α))).
We recall that n > b 2 t k = t i=0 ∆ i k . Using the above bound, we see that n is at least t i=0 Ω(n/(α(i + α))) = Ω( n log(t/α) α ). Therefore, we have α ≥ Θ(log(t/α)) and so α ≥ Θ(log t). We recall that k = 2 15α and 2 t k = 2 15α+t ≤ n. t is therefore constrained such that: log n ≥ 15α + t ≥ Θ(t). And so we may take t to be as large as Θ(log n), giving us a lower bound of α ≥ Θ(log log n).
A truthful log n-approximation mechanism
Here we show a simple randomized mechanism that achieves a log n approximation to social welfare. In Section 6 we show that this is nearly optimal for the natural class of "online envy-free" mechanisms.
Let RandomGuess be the mechanism that selects a supply g ∈ {2, 4, 8, . . . , 2 i , . . . , n} uniformly at random, and considers only the highest g bidders according to permutation order. When an item arrives the mechanism sells it to the first of the remaining such bidders and charges him vg+1. 5 Proposition 4.6. RandomGuess is truthful and achieves a log n approximation to social welfare.
We defer this proof to the full version of the paper. We leave open the problem of closing the gap between the above log n factor and the Ω(log log n) lower bound of Theorem 4.3. In section 6 we strengthen this lower bound to Ω(log n/ log log n) for the class of online-envy-free mechanisms, also defined in section 6. We conjecture that Ran-domGuess is optimal.
STOCHASTIC SUPPLY
Given the strong lower bounds we have shown in the adversarial setting, we now consider the stochastic setting in which supply is drawn from some distribution D known to the mechanism. In this section, we give our second main result, a deterministic truthful mechanism that achieves an O(1)-approximation to social welfare for any distribution with non-decreasing hazard rate. We also show a constant lower bound, showing that no truthful deterministic mechanism can achieve better than a φ ≈ 1.63 approximation to social welfare, and no randomized mechanism can achieve better than a 4/(2 + √ 2) ≈ 1.17 approximation, for distributions that satisfy the monotone hazard rate condition. At the end of this section we show that some condition on the supply distribution must be assumed to achieve constant approximation.
We consider the following mechanism that takes as input a distribution D. The mechanism is deterministic, so all probabilities are over the distribution D. We note that the mechanism decides on a maximal number of items it is going to sell without looking at the bids. Although it seems somewhat surprising it still achieves good approximation when the non-decreasing hazard rate condition holds.
HazardGuess(D):
1. Fix an arbitrary permutation π on the bidders.
2. Solicit bids, and denote them v1, . . . , vn in nonincreasing order.
3. Let s * be the smallest integer such that s * ≥ Pr[ ≥s * ] Pr[ =s * ] . If s * > 3 let g = s * . Otherwise let g = 1. 6 4. Consider only the highest g bidders ordered according to π. When an item arrives sell it to the first of the remaining such bidders and charge him vg+1 (or 0 if g = n).
5.
Assign each of the first g items that come in to the highest g bidders in the order in which they appear.
Theorem 5.1. HazardGuess(D) is truthful, and achieves a 16 7 8 -approximation to social welfare in expectation over D, for any distribution D such that the hazard rate hi(D) is non-decreasing.
Truthfulness is immediate: Every bidder with bid higher than vg+1 faces a single take-it-or-leave-it offer at the same price (vg+1). The offer and the order in which they receive the offer is independent of their own bids. To prove the approximation guarantee, we will need a series of lemmas.
The following lemmas, 5.2, 5.4 and 5.5 will show that for any distribution with non-decreasing hazard rate, maxi OPTi · Pr[ ≥ i] ≥ OPT/5. To complete the proof, we will then prove that HazardGuess achieves welfare at least (8/27) · maxi OPTi · Pr[ ≥ i], and thus achieves a 16 7 8 approximation to OPT.
Lemma 5.2. Let α be the smallest value such that for any set of bids, OPT/(maxi OPTi · Pr[ ≥ i]) ≤ α. Then for each s ∈ {0, . . . , n-1} we have the following bound on α in terms of D, which we denote Bound(s):
Proof. Suppose α > β. That is, there exists a set of bids such that for all i we have OPTi · Pr[ ≥ i] < OPT/β, or equivalently:
Recall that by definition, we have OPT = n i=1 OPTi · Pr[ = i]. Observe that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1: OPTi+1 ≤ 6 Alternatively, we can pick g = s * always, but then we must pick a random permutation in step 1 of HazardGuess. We choose to present a deterministic mechanism. i+1 i OPTi since v1, . . . , vn is a non-increasing sequence. By repeated application of this observation, we get the following n upper-bounds on OPT indexed by 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 1:
Applying inequality 4 and multiplying both sides by β/OPT we obtain:
If α is the optimal approximation factor, there is some input such that for every > 0,maxi OPTi · Pr[ ≥ i] achieves an α approximation but does not achieve a β = α − approximation, and the above bound on β holds. Since α = β + , letting tend to zero, we obtain the lemma.
Remark 5.3. We must now show that for every distribution D, there exists an s such that Bound(s) gives α ≤ 5. Note that the order of quantifiers is important! It is not the case that there exists an s such that for every distribution, Bound(s) gives α ≤ O(1).
Lemma 5.4. For any s ≥ 1 and hi ∈ [1/s, 1]:
Proof. We defer the proof of this technical lemma to the full version. Proof. Given a distribution D, we wish to find the value of s such that Bound(s) gives the sharpest bound on α (the approximation factor from lemma 5.2). We choose s * ≤ n to be the smallest integer such that s * ≥ Pr[ ≥ s * ]/ Pr[ = s * ]. If no such s * exists, we choose s * = n. We now show that Bound(s * ) gives α ≤ 5. We bound the two terms of Bound(s * ) separately. Consider the first term: 
where the inequality follows from Lemma 5.4. Therefore, finally we have for all s * :
Combining these two bounds, we finally get that Bound(s * ) gives α ≤ 5. 
, since the hazard rate hi is non-decreasing, and hs * ≥ 1/s * . Therefore, we have:
Therefore, in this case, HazardGuess(D) achieves welfare at least OPTi · Pr[ ≥ i]/3. Now consider the case in which 1 ≤ i < s * : By definition of s * : Pr[ ≥s * −1] Pr[ =s * −1] > s * − 1. Alternatively, we may write the hazard rate at s * − 1: hs * −1 < 1/(s * − 1). Since the hazard rate is non-decreasing, we have that for all i ≤ s * − 1, hi < 1/(s * − 1). Therefore we have: 
Better Bounds for Specific Distributions
We note that our analysis is worst-case, and that this mechanism can be shown to achieve a better constant approximation for specific distributions of interest. Proofs from this section are found in the full version of the paper. For example:
Proposition 5.6. HazardGuess(D) achieves a 5 3 approximation to social welfare in expectation over D when D is the uniform distribution over {1, . . . , n}. Moreover, there are values for which HazardGuess(D) cannot get better than a 4 3 -approximation when D is the uniform distribution.
Proposition 5.7. HazardGuess(D) achieves an (e + 1)/(e − 1) ≈ 2.16-approximation to social welfare in expectation over D when D is the geometric distribution defined as PrD[ = k] = (1 − p) k−1 p, for any value of the parameter p ∈ (0, 1).
We remark that the geometric distribution is the extremal MHR distribution: the hazard rate of the geometric distribution is constant.
We also compute bounds on the approximation ratio of our mechanism for the binomial distribution for specific values of n, and find that it achieves at least 64% of the optimum in the range of n that we check. This approximation factor quickly converges to 100% as n grows. See the the full version of the paper for details of the analysis and a graph of the bound we prove on the approximation factor for specific values of n.
In considering these bounds, one should note that it is not possible to get perfect efficiency, since we are comparing ourselves to a very strong adversary: the offline optimum. We show that it is impossible to get close to perfect efficiency. We prove constant lower bounds, bounded away from 1, both for deterministic and randomized truthful mechanisms:
Proposition 5.8. No deterministic truthful mechanism guarantees better than a φ approximation to social welfare in expectation over distributions that satisfy the monotone hazard rate condition, where φ = (1 + √ 5)/2 is the golden ratio. No randomized truthful mechanism can guarantee better than a 4/(2 + √ 2) approximation.
The Necessity of a Condition on the Distribution:
We next show that some condition on the supply distribution is necessary: for arbitrary distributions no deterministic mechanism can achieve constant approximation to social welfare.
Theorem 5.9. No deterministic truthful mechanism achieves an o( log n/ log log n) approximation to social welfare when faced with arbitrary stochastic supply (without the non decreasing hazard rate condition).
We prove this theorem in the full version of the paper. The proof proceeds in two stages. First, we consider a class of truthful mechanisms that fix -independently of the bids-an ordering π on the bidders, and a supply g. Such a mechanism sells the first g items that arrive at the (g + 1)-st highest price to the g highest bidders , ordered according to π. We note that HazardGuess is such a mechanism, and all such mechanisms satisfy a notion of envy-freeness which we define in the next section. We show that such mechanisms cannot achieve an o(log n/ log log n) approximation to social welfare when faced with arbitrary stochastic supply. We then complete the proof by showing that we can restrict our attention to such mechanisms almost without loss of generality: for any deterministic mechanism, there exists a mechanism that chooses its supply independently of the bids that loses only a quadratic factor in its approximation to social welfare.
ENVY-FREE MECHANISMS
All our mechanisms satisfy a notion of fairness which is our adaptation of envy-freeness to the online setting. An offline mechanism is envy-free if no agent prefers another agent's allocation and payment to his own (see, for example, [13, 14] ). In the case of unit demand bidders and identical goods this means that there is a price p such that any winner pays the same price p and has value at least p, and any loser has value at most p. This is clearly not possible to achieve for online supply, except by trivial mechanisms (for example, the mechanism that only sells a single item to the highest bidder at the second highest price). Informally, in an online envy-free mechanism, the only source of envy is a shortage of supply, not price discrimination on the part of the mechanism. Definition 6.1. A deterministic mechanism is onlineenvy-free if it is envy-free (in the offline sense) when the supply is enough to satisfy the demand of all of the bidders (that is, when l = n). A randomized mechanism is onlineenvy free if it is a distribution over deterministic onlineenvy-free mechanisms.
Note that this definition ensures that all sold items are sold for the same price, even when the supply is smaller than n. Also note that both our mechanisms RandomGuess and HazardGuess are online-envy-free.
In Theorem 4.3 we showed that no truthful randomized mechanism can achieve an o(log log n) approximation to social welfare when faced with adversarial supply. Here, we present an improved lower bound for truthful online-envy free mechanisms. Proposition 6.2. No truthful online-envy-free mechanism (even randomized) can achieve an o(log n/ log log n) approximation to social welfare when faced with adversarial supply.
Proof. For an envy-free mechanism, we may assume that all offered prices c1, . . . , cn are equal: for all i, ci = c. We apply inequality 1 to obtain constraints for the case in which n items arrive, and the case in which 1 item arrives. When n items arrive, we have for all i Pr[Ni−1 < n] = 1, and obtain the constraint: n · c ≥ (n − 1) log n 2α − n
When a single item arrives, we have Pr[Ni−1 < 1] = ((n − 2 c+1 )/(n − 1)) i−1 , since each bidder independently accepts the offer price 1/2 c with probability (2 c+1 −1)/(n−1). Also, OPT1 ≥ 1/2. We obtain the constraint:
Setting α = o(log n/ log log n), we see that constraint 5 requires c = ω(log log n). It is simple to verify that the left hand side of constraint 6 is decreasing in c in the range [log log n, log(n) − 1], and that setting c = ω(log log n) fails to satisfy 6, which proves the claim.
Note that proposition 6.2 is nearly tight, since Ran-domGuess achieves a log n approximation factor.
VALUATIONS WITH COMPLEMEN-TARITIES: KNAPSACK VALUATIONS
So far we have discussed bidders that are interested in a single item out of a set of identical items. It is natural to consider the case of bidders with increasing-marginal utility valuations, corresponding to complements valuations. In the extreme case, we get knapsack valuations.
We say that a bidder i has a knapsack valuation if he has a value ci and a desired quantity ki: For all k < ki, vi(k) = 0, and for all k ≥ ki, vi(k) = ci. That is, bidder i desires at least ki units of the good, is not satisfied with fewer, and has no value for more than ki units.
Knapsack valuations can be seen as modeling advertising campaigns: a buyer wishes to build brand name recognition through banner-advertisements, and so has little value for a small number of advertisements; A campaign is worth ci to the advertiser, but additional advertising saturation has little added benefit.
Unfortunately, the online nature of the problem makes knapsack valuations difficult to handle for any algorithm, even without truthfulness (and computational) constraints. Here, we present an algorithm in the stochastic setting, and show that its (poor) competitive ratio is optimal over the class of all (not necessarily truthful) algorithms. Without loss of generality, we can assume that D has finite support over [1, m] for m = n i=1 ki. Our lower bound for Knapsack valuations shows that with online supply, no algorithm can guarantee a better approximation ratio than the cumulative hazard rate. This welfare guarantee is quite poor. For the uniform distribution, this gives α=Θ(log m). For the binomial distribution, α = Θ(m). We also present a matching upper bound showing that our lower bound is tight. Missing proofs appear in the full version of the paper. Proposition 7.1. No algorithm can have better than a m i=1 hi approximation to optimal social welfare. Proof. Consider any arbitrary distribution D and scale it so that it has positive support on [m+1, 2m]. Alternately, imagine it has positive support on [1, m] , and that m items are guaranteed to arrive; the distribution is on how many additional items will arrive. We construct a set of n = m bidders 1, . . . , m. Bidder i has ki = m + i and ci = 1/ Pr[ ≥ i]. By construction, at most one bidder can have his demand satisfied by any knapsack size. Since bidder values are nondecreasing, we have
hi However, since at most one bidder can be satisfied by any knapsack size, no algorithm can do better than picking some bidder i and assigning all items that arrive to bidder i. Such an algorithm achieves welfare ci in the case that ki items arrive. By construction, this yields expected welfare (1/ Pr[ ≥ i]) · Pr[ ≥ i] = 1, which completes the proof.
Proposition 7.2. For any distribution D with (arbitrary) hazard rate hi there exists an algorithm that achieves at least a m i=1 hi approximation to optimal social welfare.
